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PATENT LAW: SYNERGISM REJECTED
JOHN

R.

CROSSAN*

In the past year, from June 1978 through May 1, 1979,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has issued nine published opinions in the intellectual property field. The court has emphatically rejected 2 all "synergism" tests for measuring the obviousness3
or non-obviousness of a combination patent under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Republic Industries, Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 4 and three other decisions 5 continue the court's progress in clarifying the guidelines for determination under section 103 of the obviousness or non-obviousness of6
patented inventions, as previously identified in these annual reviews.
During this term, the court in Velsicol ChemicalCorp. v. Monsanto Co. 7
also severely restricted "the right of the parties to take further testimony" in district court reviews of decisions of patent office boards of
* Associate, Cook, Wetzel & Egan, Ltd., Chicago; B.S., University of Virginia; J.D., University of Chicago.
1. The earliest decision discussed here is Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 579
F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1978), decided June 30, 1978. The most recent is Panduit Corp. v. Dennison
Mfg. Co., 593 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1979), decided March 12, 1979.
2. Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 972 (7th Cir. 1979). See text
accompanying notes 20-88 infra.
3. "Synergism," a recently-coined and variously-defined term in patent law, refers to the
combined action of two or more agents producing an effect greater than the sum of the several
effects taken separately. An invention or discovery, to be patentable, must be "new and useful,"
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1978); "novel," 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1978); and, "non-obvious," 35 U.S.C. § 103
(1978). The non-obviousness condition requires:
A patent may not be obtained. . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains.
4. 592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979).
5. Hanig Prods., Inc. v. K.O. Lee Co., 594 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Centsable
Prods., Inc. v. Lemelson, 591 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1979); Scholl, Inc. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 580 F.2d 244
(7th Cir. 1978).
6. See Schneider, Patent Law, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 408 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Schneider]; Sprowl, Patent Law, 51 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 527 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Sprowl].
Statements in Klitzke, PatentLaw, 55 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 183, 191-92 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Klitzke], with respect to synergism and the case of St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., Inc., 549 F.2d
833 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977), are modified by the court's decision in Republic
Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979). In St. Regis, the Seventh Circuit
stated that "unless the combination is 'synergistic, that is result[ing] in an effect greater than the
sum of the several effects taken separately,' it cannot be patented." 549 F.2d at 838. In Republic,
the court of appeals held that a combination need not have a synergistic effect to be patentable,
but rather must meet the standard of non-obviousness under section 103. 592 F.2d at 968-72.
7. 579 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1978).
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patent interferences. 8 That right was previously preserved under 35
U.S.C. § 146. 9 The majority decision in Velsicol has created a "new
and stultifying standard" for litigants appealing decisions of the board
of patent interferences.' 0 The court in one further patent matter held
that a patent was not proven to be invalid by its invention having been
on sale prior to its critical date." In another case, the Seventh Circuit
held that the compulsory royalty provisions' 2 of the old Copyright
Act' 3 did not permit the pirating of musical recordings.' 4 The court
also held in Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc. '5 that a registered service
mark granted to "Telemed," in a distinctive type font, was, in the absence of a showing of secondary meaning, invalid as merely descriptive
of computer analysis services by telephone.
In Celotex Corp. v. Jacuzzi Whirpool Bath, 16 the court of appeals
issued an important decision regarding laches and estoppel in patent
law. Laches and estoppel may bar the enforcement of a patent against
a manufacturer who once was charged with infringement but whose
conduct had gone unchallenged for at least six years. 17 That the Celotex case was disposed of by unpublished order rather than by published opinion, under Circuit Rule 35,18 leads us to emphasize the point
8. An interference is "a proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of
priority of invention between two or more parties claiming substantially the same patentable in" 37 C.F.R. § 1.201(a) (1979).
vention ..
9. 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
Any party to an interference dissatisfied with the decision of the board of patent interferences on the question of priority, may have remedy by civil action. . . . In such suits the
record in the Patent and Trademark Office shall be admitted on motion of either party
upon the terms and conditions as to costs, expenses, and the further cross-examination of
the witnesses as the court imposes, without prejudice to the right of the parties to take
further testimony.
10. 579 F.2d at 1051 (Pell, J., dissenting).
II. CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 593 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying
notes 137-48 infra.
12. 17 U.S.C. § I(e) (1970); Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 959 (1979). See text accompanying notes 171-74 infra.
13. 17 U.S.C. § I(e) (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-2318 (1978)). A complete
revision of the federal copyright laws was enacted in 1976 and became effective in 1978.
14. 583 F.2d at 377.
15. 588 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying note 175 infra.
16. No. 77-1561 (7th Cir. June 21, 1978) (unpublished order). See text accompanying notes
161-70 infra.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1978) provides, in pertinent part:
[N]o recovery shall be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to
the filing of the complaint..,

for infringement ....

This time limitation has been applied to bar entirely infringement claims where the patentee has
allowed the infringement to continue unchallenged by legal action or bona fide threats of enforcement during that time period. See, e.g., Advanced Hydraulics, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 525 F.2d
477 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 423 U.S. 869 (1975); Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 464
F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1972).
18. For the text of Circuit Rule 35, see note 167 infra.
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of law decided in that case, even if the case itself may not be cited
under the circuit rule.
Service upon intellectual property appeals panels and the writing
of decisions were evenly distributed among the judges of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit this past year. Judges
Tone and Castle wrote two opinions each; Judges Bauer, Sprecher,
Swygert, and Cummings wrote one opinion each. Judge Pell wrote one
vigorous dissent. Chief Judge Fairchild and Judge Wood were on
three panels each, but wrote no opinions. Thus, no single judge has
taken a prominent role this past year in intellectual property matters,
although Judge Tone' 9 continues to be more active and visible than
others.
In the five cases in which the validity of patents was decided, the
court of appeals affirmed district court holdings of invalidity three
times. It reversed one holding of patent validity below, on obviousness
grounds. The court also reversed one district court holding of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), 20 holding the patent valid for failure of
the accused infringer to prove a prior sale. Thus, four patents were
invalidated by the court, while one was upheld.
THE REJECTION OF SYNERGISM

The most important decision of the past year's term was Republic
Industries, Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co.2 1 The court, per Judge Swygert,

squarely rejected the notion that the United States Supreme Court had
prescribed any "synergism" standard2 2 as a "special test for the evaluation of combination claims. '2 3 After examining the various judicial
formulations of synergism, the court concluded that "synergism is only
a figure of speech," and that, "in its literal sense synergism never has
'2 4
existed and never can exist in mechanical or hydraulic inventions.
Finding the synergism concept fundamentally flawed, and regretting
19. Judge Tone was denominated apparent successor to the role of Justice Stevens in Schneider, supra note 6, at 408.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1978) provides, in pertinent part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was . . . in public use or

on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent
in the United States ....
See text accompanying notes 154-60 infra.
21. 592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979).
22. The various formulations developed by the litigants and by the Seventh Circuit were
discussed by the court in Republic. 592 F.2d at 967, 969-70 n.20.
23. Id. at 969.
24. Id. at 970. See text accompanying notes 72-76 infra.
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the "confusion" 25 caused by its prior decisions, especially in its recent
holding in St. Regis PaperCo. v. Bemis Co. ,26 the court of appeals held
the patent in Republic invalid solely under the Graham v. John Deere
Co.2 7 tests for applying the obviousness standard under section 103.28
The court's opinion in Republic is a commendable, if overdue, response
to the conceptual problem which the court, by the same panel, had created in St. Regis Paperover the dissent of Judge Pell. 29 A brief review
of the St. Regis and Republic cases helps to explain the vigor of the
position now taken against synergism by the court.
In St. Regis, Chief Judge Morgan of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois upheld the validity of three
patents for gussetted multi-wall, pinch bottom, open mouth bags. 30 In
so holding, the district court rejected defenses of invalidity for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.11 Relying on the presumption of patent
validity, 32 the district court held:
[D]efendant's references do create an impression of superficial obviousness which might persuade the uninitiated person to conclude
that Lokey achieved nothing of patentable stature. Yet the Examiner
looked past and through that superficiality and recognized that
Lokey did embody an inventive concept which achieved a result
for
which practitioners in the art had theretofore striven in vain. 33
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the validity ruling and
remanded the case to the district court for dismissal. Relying on the
United States Supreme Court's holdings in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.34
and Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Co., 35 the court of appeals held
that "unless the combination is 'synergistic, that is "result[ing] in an
effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately,"' it
25. 592 F.2d at 971.
26. 549 F.2d 833 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977).
27. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). See also Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248 (1851).
28. The steps set forth in Graham for determining the validity of a patent under section 103
are: (1) the scope and content of the prior art must be determined; (2) differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue must be ascertained; and, (3) the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. 383 U.S. at 17. Secondary considerations such as commercial success, a
long unfulfilled need for the invention, the failure of others to successfully meet the need may be
examined as part of the circumstances giving rise to the subject matter sought to be patented. Id.
29. 549 F.2d 839. See text accompanying note 39 infra.
30. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., 403 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. 111.1975).
3 1. The absence of any hearing below on the issue of the synergism of the combination bag
patents was the subject of applications for rehearing and for rehearing en banc before the court of
appeals. The petitions were denied.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1978) provides, in pertinent part:
A patent shall be presumed valid.
33. 403 F. Supp. at 783.
34. 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976).
35. 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
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cannot be patented." 36 Finding that all the claimed elements of each of
the paper bag patents under litigation were old in the art, the court of
appeals concluded:
Therefore, the Lokey bag is only entitled to a patent #"the fusion
of the old elements that comprised the Poppe patent and the old element of multiple layering3 7created a synergistic combination. We
hold that it did not do SO.
Similarly, the use of hot melt adhesive in the reissue bags did
not create a synergistic combination. . . .[Hiot melt adhesive is well
known in the art, and its use in place of glue did not transform
Goodrich '317 and '318 into concepts which had effects greater than
the sum of 38
the effects produced by the old elements on which they
were based.
Judge Pell's short dissent in St. Regis did not expressly object to
the court's language requiring synergism in a combination patent. He
warned that the court's holding could have a chilling effect on "truly
inventive combinations" which are as innovative and valuable as any,
increasingly rare, entirely new invention. 39 To be sure, the court's
opinion in St. Regis did cite40 Graham together with Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood4' as recognizing that section 103 "codiflies] the [judicially
imposed] requirement of non-obviousness," but the accepted three-part
test of Graham42 was not mentioned nor expressly applied in St. Regis.
43
In Republic Industries,Inc. v. Schlage Lock CO.,
the patent in
issue involved a hydraulic door closer device featuring momentary
manual release, whereby a door held by the device in any open position
is self-closing when a momentary manual movement of the door opens
an internal dual-area valve. The defendant raised obviousness as a defense in the district court. Chief District Judge Morgan reviewed the
entire synergism concept before finding himself bound by the ruling of
the Seventh Circuit in St. Regis-which, in that case, had reversed
Chief Judge Morgan's own validity finding.
According to the district court, the United States Supreme Court,
in A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.," had only "hinted" at the
36. 549 F.2d at 838, citing Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
37. 549 F.2d at 838 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 839.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 838.
41. 52 U.S. (IIHow.) 248 (1851).
42. 383 U.S. at 17. For the Graham test, see note 28 supra.
43. 433 F. Supp. 666 (S.D. I11.
1977) (Morgan, C.J.).
44. 340 U.S. 147 (1950). In 4 & P, the challenged invention was a cashier's counter equipped
with a three-sided frame or rack, with no top or bottom, which, when pushed or pulled, moved
groceries deposited in it. Id. at 149.
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synergism concept 45 prior to the time the "synergism" term itself
emerged in 1969, in Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Co.46 The
court reviewed Black Rock and held that "Black Rock does not appear
to be subject to an interpretation of having established a new test for
obviousness under section 103." 47 The court found that both the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Ninth Circuit have expressly
construed Black Rock as a reaffirmation of the Graham criteria, 48 and
that the Third and Tenth Circuits have implicitly agreed. 49 The district
court also noted that the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have,
in contrast, interpreted Black Rock as establishing a new criteria"synergism"-for a non-obviousness finding.50 Finally, the court
reviewed Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.51 and Dann v. Johnston.5 2 These
United States Supreme Court cases were found to manifest "apparent
53
ambivalence" on the synergism criteria.
The district court in Republic next contrasted the 1976 ruling of
the Seventh Circuit in Pederson v. Stewart- Warner Corp.,54 with that
court's recent and controlling 1977 ruling in St. Regis. The district
court held that, "[t]he issue of validity thus depends upon the factual
demonstration that the Slaybaugh elements, in the combination
claimed, do achieve some effect greater than the sum of the effects of
the several elements taken separately. '5 5 Finding that all of the elements but one were present in the prior door-closer art, that dual-area
hydraulic valves were known in the art of hydraulic systems generally,
and that "each element of the Slaybaugh combination merely produces
the effect which the prior art taught that it would produce," the district
court held that it was not synergistic to combine those elements, and

45. Id. at 151-52.
46. 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
47. 433 F. Supp. at 669.
48. See note 28 supra. See also Application of Fielder, 471 F.2d 640, 644-45 (3d Cir. 1973);
Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 951 (1971).
49. 433 F. Supp. at 670. See, e.g., Rutter v. Williams, 541 F.2d 878, 881 (10th Cir. 1976);
United States Expansion Bolt Co. v. Jordon Indus., Inc., 488 F.2d 566, 568 (3d Cir. 1973).
50. Id. See, e.g., International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453, 457 (Ist
Cir. 1976); Parker v. Motorola, Inc., 524 F.2d 518, 531-32 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
975 (1976); Bolkcom v. Carborundum Co., 523 F.2d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
951 (1976); Koppers Co. v. S & S Corrugated Paper Mach. Co., 517 F.2d 1182, 1188 (2d Cir.
1975).
51. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
52. 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
53. 433 F. Supp. at 671.
54. 536 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1976), ceri. denied, 429 U.S. 985 (1979).
55. 433 F. Supp. at 671.
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held the patent invalid for obviousness. 5 6
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit highlighted at the outset the " 'recurrent problem' of the proper criteria by which a combination patent
is measured for non-obviousness. ' 57 In a special analysis section of its
opinion, 58 the court of appeals noted the very early criterion of patentability developed by the courts: that a device had to be "an invention"
in order to be patentable. 59 The court characterized the "invention"
standard as "elusive," and found that it has "resulted in an inconsistent
and unpredictable body of law because it required that the decision of
patentability be based ultimately upon the subjective whims of the reviewing court."'60 The Congress sought to "start afresh in a semantic
sense and to promote uniformity" 6' in the Patent Act of 1952, by replacing the judicially-created requirement of "invention" with a requirement of "non-obviousness" in section 103.62
Section 103 was definitively interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court in Graham, where it set forth a three-pronged test of
obviousness. 63 That test, said the court of appeals, forms the backdrop
against which the Sakraida and Black Rock cases are to be considered.
The court agreed with the district court's characterization of the "ambivalence" of these cases. 64 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Neither Sakraida nor Black Rock can be cited as prescribing some
other, special test for the evaluation of combination claims. Nowhere in these two decisions did the Court hold a synergistic effect to
be a necessary condition of patentability; nor did it hold that synergism supercedes a finding of nonobviousness under the Graham
65
analysis. To the contrary, each case quoted Graham with approval.
Having thus found itself without an authoritative prescription of
any special test of or including synergism, and not being itself bound
by the "confused" state of its earlier decisions, 66 the court of appeals
56. Id. at 673.
57. 592 F.2d at 964.
58. Id. at 967-72.
59. Id. at 967. The court traced the "invention" criteria to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S.
(11How.) 248 (1851).
60. 592 F.2d at 967.
61. Id. at 998.
62. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
63. 383 U.S. at 17. See note 28 supra.
64. 591 F.2d at 972. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
65. Id. at 969.
66. Id. at 964, 971. The resulting confusion in the district courts is evidenced in, e.g., A.F.
Dormeyer Mfg. Co. v. International Components Corp., No. 76 C 2134 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 1978);
Harig Prods., Inc. v. K.O. Lee Co., 195 U.S.P.Q. 292 (N.D. 111.1977); Saunders v. Air-Flo Co., 435
F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 433 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.
Ill. 1977).
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analyzed the synergism test itself. The court first found flaws in the
application and in the definition of the synergism test. The court of
appeals quoted Judge Hand's reasoning in Reiner v. I. Leon Co. 6 7 as to
the idleness of a theory that combinations of old elements cannot be
inventions. 68 Determining whether the claimed combination "is syner69
gistic or produces a synergistic effect" was noted to be "no easy task,"
since synergism "in its literal sense. . . never has existed and never can
-o Synergism was
"...
exist in mechanical or hydraulic invention .
imprecise,
elusive "invenequated
by
the
court
of
appeals
with
the
thus
tion" standard used prior to, and abolished by, the Patent Act of
1952.

7 1

The court next found three additional, "more fundamental flaws"
in any synergism standard for patentability. First, non-obviousness,
not synergism, is the sole congressionally mandated test in section 103
for patentability of a novel and useful invention, whether that invention comprises a combination of old elements or not. 72 Second, a synergism test, which looks exclusively to the functioning of the individual
components after combination, is necessarily based on the assumption
that it is "always obvious to take known elements and combine
them."'7 3 To the contrary, the court noted that it may be the act of
selecting the elements for combination which is itself non-obvious and
therefore invention. 74 Third, the non-obviousness standard must be
applied at the time the invention was achieved, whereas any synergism
test "centers exclusively on the performance of the elements after combination and without regard to the obviousness or non-obviousness of
' '75
making the combination.
The court apologized for the lack of "clear and consistent guidance" heretofore provided, but noted that it had, whether expressly or
impliedly, consistently applied the Graham analysis so that St. Regis
67. 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
68. Id. at 969, citing Reiner v. 1. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 929 (1961). The district court which decided Republic subsequently upheld, in John Deere
Co. v. International Harvester Co., 460 F. Supp. 523, 533, 535 (S.D. I11.1978), the validity of a
combination patent to a farm implement, finding synergism as required by St. Regis.
69. 592 F.2d at 969.
70. Id. at 970.
71. An "invention" is presently defined as "any invention or discovery," whether patentable
or not. Id. at 968 n.13; 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (1978). One commentator has noted the increased
difficulty of determining obviousness caused by the coining of such oversimplifying "catch-phrase
substitutes." Schneider, supra note 6, at 410.
72. 592 F.2d at 971.
73. Id.
74. Id., citing B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1935).
75. 592 F.2d at 971 (emphasis in the original).
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and other cases were properly decided. Finally, the court of appeals
declared that unless and until its position is overruled by the Congress
or the Supreme Court, "This Court will continue to apply the Graham
analysis as the exclusive means by which to measure non-obviousness
under section 103." ' 76 Adding a caveat to the effect that the high standard of patentability reflected in the Black Rock and Sakraida decisions should be maintained, 77 the court then entered upon a traditional,
78
Graham-basedobviousness analysis.
The Seventh Circuit's position rejecting the synergism test has not
at this writing been widely recognized, followed, or rejected by the
other United States Courts of Appeals. 79 The United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals had held, in In Re Kollman,80 that nonobviousness rather than synergism is the "correct statutory standard"
for assessing patentability. Contrary to the district court's finding in
Republic8' that the Tenth and Ninth Circuits adhere to the Graham
analysis rather than the synergism test of Black Rock, both circuits
have imposed synergism requirements or close equivalents in cases decided after Republic. In March 1979, the Tenth Circuit, citing Sakraida, held that "[i]n order for the combination of old elements to
prevail, there must be a synergistic effect, that is, an effect greater than
the sum of the several effects taken separately. ' 82 In May 1979, the
Tenth Circuit held: "A combination of known elements may be patent83 Simiable, but the result in such a case must be truly synergistic."
larly, the Ninth Circuit has required that a combination patent
represent a "new, unusual, or synergistic result" in order to avert a
finding of obviousness. 84 More recently, the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed its stance that a "combination patent . . .[must] produce an
unusual or surprising result in order to be non-obvious." 85 The United
76. Id. at 971-72 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 972.
78. See note 28 supra. For an analysis of the court's approach this year to obviousness, see
text accompanying notes 109-25 infra.
79. Among federal courts of appeals, only the Second Circuit has relied on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Republic. In Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361 (2d Cir.
1979), the Second Circuit held that the validity of a patent should be evaluated under section 103.
However, the Champion court did not expressly comment upon the controversy regarding the use
of the synergism test for determining the validity of a patent. Id. at 372.
80. 595 F.2d 48 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
81. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
82. John Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp., 593 F.2d 956, 962 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct.
75 (1979).
83. True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 506 (10th Cir. 1979).
84. Herschensohn v. Hoffman, 593 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir.), 100 S. Ct. 84 (1979).
85. Lawrence v. Gillette Co., 603 F.2d 59, 69 (9th Cir. 1979), citing Kamei-Auto Komfort v.
Eurasian Automotive Prods., 553 F.2d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 1977).
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States Supreme Court has declined to respond to the Seventh Circuit's
challenge, denying petitions for certiorari in cases where the synergism
test was applied.8 6 The Seventh Circuit, in a case subsequent to Republic, adopted the lower court's holding with the caveat that references by
the district court to the concept of synergism must be read in light of
87
the Republic decision.
The Seventh Circuit's rejection of any and all synergism tests as
elements in the determination of the obviousness of inventions is sure
to have a favorable impact upon the patent law. It will remove the
imprecision in judicial decision making which that test has caused, and
properly return attention to the application of the three-pronged primary test of Graham. Although the Graham test imposes a stringent
standard, and has uncertainties of its own, 88 the test has, in the thirteen
years since its issuance, been applied with sufficient frequency to guide
both courts and litigants in the weighing of the facts surrounding the
obviousness determination. As litigants and courts begin to regularly
apply the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Republic, the ill-founded concept of synergism will fade entirely away. A congressional or United
States Supreme Court overruling of Republic's rejection of synergism is
highly unlikely.
OBVIOUSNESS DETERMINATION IN THE ABSENCE
OF A SYNERGISM TEST

The Republic decision was the third of only four cases involving
obviousness decided by the Seventh Circuit in the past year. The rejection of the synergism test allowed the court of appeals to revert to its
usual pattern of obviousness analysis 89 under the Graham tests. The
pattern requires a characterization of the invention in layman's terms, a
survey of the prior art to see whether that art suggested making the
invention once the problem or goal was in mind, and an application of
the obviousness "standard."
86. Eg., Manufacturers Sys., Inc. v. A.D.M. Indus. Inc., 590 F.2d 338 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 2841 (1979). See also Grayhill, Inc. v. A.M.F., Inc., 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir.), ceri. denied,
99 S. Ct. 2863 (1979).
87. Harig Prods., Inc. v. K.O. Lee Co., 594 F.2d 609, 610 (7th Cir. 1979).
88. Foremost among the ambiguities is the role to be accorded "secondary considerations."
The "secondary considerations" include commercial success of the invention, any long felt need
for it, and the failure of others to make the invention. See Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock
Co., 592 F.2d 963, 975 (7th Cir. 1979); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966);
Schneider, supra note 6, at 410 n.13; and text accompanying notes 115-16 infra.
89. See Schneider, supra note 6, at 410 (discussing factual context of the invention and then
the legal standard of the obviousness determination).
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First, the court, in Scholl, Inc. v. S.S. Kresge Co.,90 reversed a
judgment of patent validity issued by District Judge Will. The patent
in dispute protected Scholl's popular wooden-sole exercise sandal.
Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Tone characterized the invention negatively: "Reduced to its essentials, the alleged invention consists of changing the position provided for the big toe in the sole of the
sandal."'9 The court next characterized a prior art design as "the same
as" the claimed device of the patent, noting that the Scholl patent
"merely called for two changes" in that design, "neither of which was
new.' ' 92 The patented invention thus "amounted to changing the
Berkemann sandal by honing off the ridge under the big toe as advocated by Brachman and providing a slight depression as taught not
also by the
only by the production model of the Berkemann sandal but
93
book."
Company
Shoe
Musebeck
the
and
Stroup patent
Finding that the only function of the changed design was to promote comfort of the foot, the court held the invention obvious and the
patent invalid. The court dismissed a last argument, concluding that
"[tihe discovery that the combination also had some orthopedic benefit
would not make patentable that which was already in the public do94
main."
In its second obviousness decision, Centsable Products, Inc. v.
Lemelson, 95 the court, per Judge Cummings, affirmed a summary judgment of obviousness in the court below. The patented device was a
safety dart game featuring Velcro fabric on both the darts and the target. The district court's obviousness finding was supported by a prior
patent 96 which involved a natural thistle burr attached to an artificial
blossom or other object to be thrown at a textile target. According to
the court of appeals, the earlier patent further taught that substitution
97
of an artificial burr was "within the scope and spirit of the invention."
The court noted the general rule that substitution of materials is not
patentable invention, 98 and that, in view of the plain obviousness of the
combination of Velcro with items to be separably joined, no need exists
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
are not

580 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
580 F.2d at 245.
Id.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 248.
591 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 79 (1979).
591 F.2d at 402.
Id. at 403.
Id. The court's caveat, id. n.6, that other patents substituting Velcro for other fasteners
necessarily invalid apparently is swallowed by the general rule.
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to account for any asserted secondary considerations.99
In Republic Industries, the court noted the two functions provided
by the patented device in controversy. 00 The court then characterized
the patent in question as being "essentially comprised of seven elements." Those "essential elements" had only a tenuous relation to the
elements set forth in the claim,' 0 ' but they were explained in a diagram
appearing in the opinion. Prior door closers had automatically stopped
02
and held a door in any position upon the removal of a manual force. 1
The court found that one prior patent had disclosed all of the elements
of the patented device which were necessary to develop the patented
03
momentary manual release feature, except for a dual-area valve.
Dual-area valves, however, were already known in the hydraulic arts.
Rejecting Republic's argument to the contrary, the court held:
The prior art that is relevant in evaluating a claim of obviousness is
defined by the nature of the problem confronting the would-be inventor.
[A] hypothetical person in the door closer art would have knowledge
of basic hydraulics. This knowledge would have included safety and
pressure relief valves which teach use of the dual area concept to
keep a valve open after the initial pressure is reduced. 104
The valve and fluid handling art was held pertinent to the "problem
confronting the would-be inventor." Because that art taught the use of
the additional element actually employed by the patentee to provide a
similar valve positioning function, the invention was "clearly obvious"
and unpatentable under section 103.1°5
The final obviousness case decided by the Seventh Circuit during
the last term was Harig Products, Inc. v. K 0. Lee Co. 106 In a per
curiam opinion, the court of appeals adopted the memorandum decision of the district court,10 7 modifying only the lower court's treatment
of synergism. The district court's decision described the invention as a
tool sharpening fixture designed to bring a cylindrical tool into controlled contact with a sharpening wheel. Previously, oil had been used
99. Id. at 403.
100. Holding a door open at any point in its arc and the automatic closing of the door after a
momentary force is applied. 592 F.2d at 965.
101. Compare the court's seven stated elements, id. at 965-66, with the actual claim language,
id. at 965. The claim, for example, does not state that the piston is "geared to the door," although
some mechanical link would, of course, be needed.
102. Id. at 966-67.
103. Id. at 973-74.
104. Id. at 975.
105. Id. at 976.
106. 594 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1979).
107. 195 U.S.P.Q. 292 (N.D. 111.1977).
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as a lubricating medium between the fixture and the tool, but oil
trapped foreign particles which impaired tool movement. The district
court refused to equate the plain superiority of the defendant's air bearing to patentable non-obviousness. The specific structural recitations
of the defendant's patent claims, such as the tapering of the ends of the
bearing sleeve of the fixture toward the shaft of the tool, were held to
be necessary features of any air bearing. Therefore, the district court
found that "what Mueller did was combine and apply old teachings
regarding air bearings to old teachings regarding tool grinding fixtures
which resulted in his superior tool grinding fixture." 08 No prior teaching of the use of air as a lubricant in a tool holder was found or considered to be necessary.
The Seventh Circuit's approach to obviousness determinations
during this past term plainly favors parties opposing patents, even
apart from the unanimous trend of the reported cases. 0 9 In each case,
the court took a simplistic approach to the subject matter. Where it
had not found an actual teaching in the prior art that an invention
should be made, as in Scholl,Inc. v. S S. Kresge Co. 10 and in Centsable
Products, Inc. v. Lemelson, I ' the court found the invention obvious
because one skilled in the art would have known that the invention
could have been made, even in the absence of any express teaching that
12
such a combination would be workable, as in Republic and Harig."13
Although the obviousness finding in any of those four cases may be
agreed with or not, depending on one's own assessment of the technology, it must be conceded that the court's approach, as in Scholl and
Republic, of looking only at "the essential elements" and simplifying
the invention will, more often than not, render patents invalid.
The last reported case decided by the Seventh Circuit in which a
patent was held both valid and infringed is instructive. In Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. American HospitalSupply Corp.,"14 an obviousness
challenge was thwarted by the patentee's expert's testimony that he had
thought the inventive step to be "stupid," and that he was "horrified"
that it had been tried until the procedure was proven to work. How108. Id. at 297.
109. All four cases involving obviousness considered by the court of appeals during the past
term were decided against the patentees.
110. 580 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). See text accompanying
notes 90-94 supra.
i11.591 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 79 (1979). See text accompanying notes
95-99 supra.
112. 592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 99-105 supra.
113. 594 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 106-08 supra.
114. 534 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1976).
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ever, "failure of others," "commercial success," and other such "contrary teachings in the art," as in Ortho, are considered to be only
"secondary" factors of non-obviousness under the Graham test, not to
be reached'" 5 unless the primary, three-prong approach of Graham
gives a "close" indication. Yet, only rarely is even a substantial advance found in an art where others working in that art were collectively
searching in the wrong direction. Frequently, significant advances are
accomplished by those working alone in a field, without the benefit of
experimentation and failure by others. Although routine applications
of engineering or developmental skills are not patentable, unusual or
significant results of the application of such skills having commercial
importance should be granted patent protection. 16 The sorting out of
the "routine" from the "unusual" is, of course, the crux of every patent
validity conflict.
Thus, the facts of a case and the various approaches of litigants for
making an invention either more or less impressive, as well as the
courts' ability to recognize real subtleties and reject various simplifications, are crucial to the outcome in an obviousness inquiry. In each of
the four cases decided by the Seventh Circuit this year, the defendant
pointed successfully to teachings in the prior art that various elements
were known or available to form the combination claimed and to produce the various functions desired and that such combination had been
suggested in the prior art or was readily available to the art. Such reasoning made the conclusion of obviousness in each case inescapable.
The court of appeals' treatment of the statutory presumption of
validity" 7 raised in an obviousness challenge is also important. The
court in Scholl, Inc. v. S S. Kresge Co., 18 made no mention of the statutory presumption of validity in reversing the district court's finding of
validity. The court in Centsable Products, Inc. v. Lemelson," 9 stated
that there is no presumption of validity where "the most important
prior art was not before the patent examiner."' 120 Next, the court in
Republic Industries, Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co.,' 2' noted that the pre115. Id. at 93. See, e.g., Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 975-76 (7th
Cir. 1979).
116. One court has held that the "secondary considerations" of Graham must always be considered in connection with the determination of obviousness. See In re Fielder, 471 F.2d 640
(C.C.P.A. 1973). See also note 28 supra.
117. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1978).
118. 580 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
119. 591 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1979).
120. Id. at 402, citing Rockwell v. Midland-Ross Corp., 438 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
121. 592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979).
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sumption of validity "merely shifts the burden of proof to the party
attacking . . . the patent," and that the presumption "does not exist"
with regard to "art" not before the Patent Office.' 22 Further, the patentee in Republic knew but did not disclose to the Patent Office the prior
dual-area valve art, so the presumption of validity did not "obtain...
against this evidence of prior art."' 123 Finally, the district court opinion
adopted in Harig Products, Inc. v. K.0. Lee Co., 24 held that "pertinent" prior art not considered by the Patent Office "largely, if not
wholly" dissipates the presumption of validity.' 25 Although the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the presumption of validity is rather variable, the presumption clearly is only a minor, and perhaps only a
procedural factor to be considered in the obviousness analysis; it has no
substantial weight in upholding a patent.
INTERFERENCE REVIEW PROCEEDINGS: TIMELINESS AND THE
LIMITATION OF ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY UNDER SECTION

146

The United States is one of a few countries which grants patents to
the first individual to make an invention 2 6 rather than to the first individual to file his patent application. 2 7 In the United States, questions
of priority of invention between or among parties claiming substantially the same patentable invention are determined in "interference
proceedings." Under the relevant statute 2 8 and the implementing
rules 29 of the Patent Office, an interference is declared by the Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office and is reviewed by a threemember Board of Patent Interferences. An interference may be declared between two competing applications or between an application
and an issued patent,130 provided that the same invention is claimed by
and would be allowable to each application. A party may have review
of a decision of a Board of Patent Interferences either by appeal to the
122. Id. at 972.
123. Id. at 974.
124. 594 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1979).
125. 195 U.S.P.Q. 292, 294 (1977).
126. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1978) provides, in pertinent part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-a) the invention was known or used by
others in this country ... before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent. ...
127. In most countries, the first individual to file an application claiming an invention is entitled to the patent as against a later-filing claimant. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667,
672 (1888); In re Bernard, 123 U.S.P.Q. 387 (1959). See generally Weinstein, The European Patent, 8 PATENT L. REV. 115, 119 (1976).

128. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1979).
129. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.201-1.287 and 1.304 (1979).
130. The claims in a patent may not be called into an interference more than one year after the
patent was issued. 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) (1979).
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United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' 3 ' or by seeking
review under section 146 in any United States District Court.132 The
benefit of proceeding in a district court has been that, besides the possi34
ble venue advantage to an applicant,133 the district court allows live,1
further 35 testimony regarding the issues disputed before a board of interferences.
Against this statutory background, the Seventh Circuit during the
past year decided two interference appeals. In PanduitCorp. v. Dennison Manufacturing Co.,136 the court held simply that time limits for
filing a section 146 civil action were complied with and reversed the
district court's holding to the contrary. More significantly, in Velsicol
Chemical Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 13 7 over a strong and well-reasoned
dissent by Judge Pell, the court of appeals upheld the exclusion of new
testimony in a section 146 civil action review proceeding.
In Panduit, the Board of Patent Interferences awarded patent priority to Dennison. Panduit then filed both a request for a rehearing
and a motion for extension of time to file a request for reconsideration.
The rehearing and reconsideration requests were dealt with separately
and confusingly, but Panduit did file its civil action less than sixty days
after the final board action. Dennison's motion to dismiss was granted,
apparently on the basis of supposed differences between a request for a
rehearing and a request for reconsideration under rules 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.304(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.256(b). The Seventh Circuit rejected the
district court's reasoning, ruling that the board's granting of permission
138
to file a supplemental argument should not penalize Panduit.
The court of appeals in Velsicol affirmed an award by a board of
interferences and by the district court of priority to the senior (first to
file) party, absent proof of any prior invention by the second party to
file (Velsicol). The district court barred Velsicol from calling at trial
131. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1979).
132. 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1979). If one party appeals on the question of priority to the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and an adverse party files a timely claim in a district court, the
district court case will take precedence under 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1979).
133. A civil action may be filed against the other party or parties to the interference under the
general federal venue and jurisdiction rules. 35 U.S.C. § 146, 2 (1979).
134. Evidence before a board of patent interferences may be presented solely by deposition.
37 C.F.R. § 1.272 (1979).
135. 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1979) provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he record in the Patent and Trademark Office shall be admitted on motion of either
party upon the terms and conditions as to costs, expenses, and the further cross-examination of the witnesses as the court imposes, without prejudice to the right of the parties to
take further testimony.
136. 593 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1979).
137. 579 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1978).
138. 593 F.2d at 802.
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two witnesses whose depositions had not been offered before the interferences board. The barred testimony would have corroborated the inventor's testimony and notebook entries and the testimony of the
inventor's immediate supervisor. During the board proceeding, counsel for Velsicol had thought the added testimony to be merely cumulative, but the board's decision characterized Velsicol's inventor's
statements as "unwitnessed" and "self-serving,' ' 39 and awarded priority to Monsanto. The district court held that Velsicol had waived its
right to offer such proof in the section 146 proceeding. A divided Seventh Circuit panel agreed. Judge Pell argued, in dissent, that exclusion
of admittedly crucial testimony was reversible error under the plain
meaning of the statute and the prior case authority.
However, Judge Wood, writing for the majority, focused on the
applicable standard for "waiver." The judge noted that: "A § 146 civil
action is a hybrid proceeding combining elements of a de novo trial and
an appellate review. However, it appears that over the long history of
this section and its predecessors the appellate character has increasingly
gained in significance."'' 40 The majority in Velsicol relied heavily on
the early Third Circuit decision in Barrett Co. v. Koppers Co., 14 1 which
limited the right to offer new evidence in a review of an interference
decision. The Velsicol court found that limitation "accepted in principle" in the Seventh Circuit, 42 and noted that the Eighth Circuit had
extended the limitation to any "deliberate, intentional, or willful withholding or suppression of pertinent and available evidence from the
Patent Office" for whatever purpose. 14 3 The majority then addressed
the provision of 35 U.S.C. § 146 which provides "for the presentation
of further testimony." The court stated: "[W]e do not find in the 'without prejudice' language a strong congressional intent in favor of the
unlimited admission of evidence not previously presented to the Board
which would hinder the courts from developing rules limiting the circumstances in which admission will be permitted."' 44
139. 579 F.2d at 1052.
140. Id. at 1043.
141. 22 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1927). The court of appeals in Koppers limited the subsequent admissibility of evidence which was wholly within the offering party's possession and control at the
time of the patent interference proceeding and which was withheld from the panel in that proceeding.
142. 579 F.2d at 1044, citing Globe-Union, Inc., v. Chicago Tel. Supply Co., 103 F.2d 722 (7th
Cir. 1939).
143. 579 F.2d at 1044, citing Kirschke v. Lamar, 426 F.2d 870, 874 (8th Cir. 1970).
144. 579 F.2d at 1045. Contrast this reliance on legislative history with that approved by the
court in Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,440 U.S. 959 (1979). See
text accompanying notes 171-74 infra.
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The majority held that to permit introduction of new testimony
would be, absent special circumstances, inconsistent with the requirement for full disclosure before the administrative tribunal, especially if
district court review is to be in the nature of an appeal only. 45 Thus,
the court found that Velsicol was "grossly negligent" in not procuring
the additional testimony before the board, because the need to corroborate the testimony Velsicol did present before the board was plain.
46
Consequently, the court upheld the district court's finding of waiver. 1
Judge Pell's strong dissent urged that the record did not support
the majority's finding of gross negligence, and characterized Velsicol's
error as "at most. . . a reasonable mistake in judgment as to the point
47
at which cumulative evidence becomes wasteful of everyone's time." 1
Judge Pell suggested that more damage would be done to the administrative process by a requirement "that any evidence available at the
time of the board proceedings . . . be introduced." 48 Judge Pell disagreed that the Globe- Union, Inc. v. Chicago Telephone Supply Co. 149
and Barrett Co. v. Koppers Co. 150 cases required the abandonment of
all de novo aspects in a section 146 proceeding. Rather, Judge Pell reasoned, those cases went only to intentional or deliberate withholding.
The court in Globe- Union allowed further testimony in the district
court specifically for the purpose of authenticating a diary. Judge Pell
decried the rigidity of the rule stated by the majority, terming it an
obstacle to the quest for truth in litigation.'51
The decision in Velsicol is, as Judge Pell suggested, at odds with
the plain wording of the statute. The right of the parties to take further
testimony is undeniably prejudiced by the Velsicol holdings, which
create yet another judicial gloss subverting the statutory purpose. As
Judge Pell pointed out, the majority's decision was not mandated by
the prior judicial authorities but extends well beyond them. The "special circumstances" which the majority saw 52 as giving life to the
"without prejudice" provision of the statute were hollow indeed. It is
hoped that the Velsicol decision will, in the future, be restricted to its
facts, with the waiver doctrine itself also being substantially restricted.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See discussion in 579 F.2d at 1046 n.10.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1051-53.
Id. at 1053.
103 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1939).
22 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1927).
579 F.2d at 1053.
Id. at 1046 n. 10, 1055-56.
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OTHER PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CASES

The Seventh Circuit during the past year decided four additional
intellectual property cases. 153 Each of the four cases resolved important issues in the patent, copyright, and trademark fields, but only the
lone unreported case created new Seventh Circuit law. Consequently,
the application of Circuit Rule 35 under these circumstances is questioned here.
In CTS Corp. v. PiherInternationalCorp.,'54 the district court held
the plaintiffs patent invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 55 because the
defendant's 56 device 5 7 was on sale in the United States more than one
year prior to the filing of the plaintiff's application for a patent. The
court of appeals held that the defendant's proof of a timely reduction to
practice of the device in question was not clear and convincing, and
reversed the holding below.
The defendant's device was allegedly on sale in the United States
more than a year before the patent application was filed. However, the
plaintiff countered that the defendant had no operable device in existence prior to the critical date. The court of appeals found that the defendant's failure to offer its own business records or to explain their
absence raised an inference that such records would not be favorable to
the defendant's position. 58 The court further found that the defendant
failed to establish the date on which operable devices incorporating the
invention were shipped from Spain. That date was significant because
those devices were received in the United States three weeks after the
critical date. The court especially relied on evidence that the defendant's customer had sought to obtain the devices for four months prior
to the critical date. The court reasoned that had the devices been oper153. CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 593 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979) (on sale more than one year
prior to application); Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978) (trademark
infringement); Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979)
(copyright); Celotex Corp. v. Jacuzzi Whirlpool Bath, No. 77-1561 (7th Cir. June 21, 1978) (laches
and estoppel in patent infringement). See text accompanying notes 154-75 infra.
154. 593 F.2d 777 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 175 (1979).
155. Section 102(b) provides, in pertinent part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless--b) the invention was . . . on sale in this
country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent. ...
156. In most cases, it is commercial exploitation of the patentee's device before the critical one
year date which is alleged to invalidate the patent. Here, if the defendant's accused device had
been completed sooner, it would have invalidated the patent.
157. The defendant had produced a variable resistance control with end collectors for adjusting an electrical circuit. Seegeneraly CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 527 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1975).
158. 593 F.2d at 780.
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able at any earlier time, then the devices would have been shipped. 159
According to the court, "clear and convincing" evidence was required
to prove both that a prior sale had occurred and to invalidate a patent.
The court of appeals held that the defendant had failed to carry its
burden of proof of early reduction to practice and that the district
160
court's finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous.
6
In the unreported case, Celotex Corp. v. Jacuzzi Whir/pool Bath,' 1
the district court had granted summary judgment for the defendant on
its claims of laches and estoppel.' 62 A charge of infringement against
the defendant made in a letter from patentee's counsel in 1966 was followed by a short period of correspondence in which invalidity was asserted. Ten years of inaction by the patentee followed. The defendant
maintained in the district court that the precise structure of the product
accused of infringing the patent in 1966 was immaterial. The district
court agreed. The asserted patent claimed a particular arrangement for
passing air to jets of water submerged within a whirlpool bath. The
defendant did not identify the controversial goods, in part because of
16 3
the passage of time and the absence of records.
The court of appeals applied the reasoning of an Ohio district
court in Nordson Corp. v. Graco, Inc.,164 which denied summary judgment in the absence of an identification of the earlier infringing conduct. The court of appeals rejected the defendant's reliance upon the
earlier Seventh Circuit holding in Rome Grader & Machinery Corp. v.
JD. Adams Manufacturing Co.,165 finding that there the identical infringing mechanism was incorporated in both the earlier and the later
accused products.166 Thus, in the absence of proof regarding the identity of the original subsequent accused structures, summary judgment
was improper.
The court's decision under Circuit Rule 35, not to publish the order in Celotex is anomalous. Indeed, the guidelines 67 of that rule ap159. Id. at 780-82.
160. Id. at 783.
161. No. 77-1561 (7th Cir. June 21, 1978).
162. Laches bars monetary claims for past damages. Estoppel bars claims for future equitable
or monetary relief. Advanced Hydraulics, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 525 F.2d 477, 479 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 869 (1975).
163. No. 77-1561, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. June 21, 1978).
164. 187 U.S.P.Q. 119 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
165. 135 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1943).
166. No. 77-1561, slip op. at 4, 6-7 (7th Cir. June 21, 1978).
167. Circuit Rule 35 provides, in pertinent part:
Guidelines for Method of Disposition
(i) Published opinions: in appeals which
(i) Establish a new or change an existing rule of law;
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pear to require publication in the Celotex case but not in the CTS case
or, for that matter, the Cenisable or Harig cases, which were reported.
Centsable,Harig, and CTS were disposed of on their own facts and the
established law, while Celotex, in adopting the reasoning of a foreign
district court and limiting Rome Grader to its facts, made new law.
Moreover, the court's decision in Celotex appears wrongly decided. 6 8 Where a prior charge of infringement has been made, the
patentee has taken a position that the claims bear upon the controversial product. By charging that same party with infringement of the
same patent after a long delay, the patentee has identified the later
product as substantially the same as the earlier product. That the later
product is a different color or carries a different model number or is a
different size or has a different configuration is irrelevant if the patentee
has asserted infringement by both the earlier and the later devices. The
proper question for decision by the court was whether the patentee, in
the earlier confrontation, acquiesced in a charge of invalidity, 169 or
whether the charge of infringement was rebutted solely by a claim of
non-infringement. Where invalidity was asserted and apparently acquiesced in, the patent holder should not be able to later assert the
patent. The laches and estoppel doctrine should protect manufacturers
against, for example, the loss of evidence of invalidity by virtue of a
prior use or sale or the like. This type of evidence was pointed to in the
early correspondence in Celotex. Prejudice to a defendant, such as by
loss of important evidence, is presumed after the lapse of six years in
patent cases. 170
(ii) Involve an issue of continuing public interest;
(iii) Criticize or question existing law;
(iv) Constitute a significant and non-duplicative contribution to legal literature...
or
(v) Reverse a judgment. . . when the lower court or agency has published an opinion . ..
(2) Unpublished orders:
(i) May be filed after an oral statement of reasons has been given from the bench
and may include only, or little more than, the judgment rendered in appeals which
(A) are frivolous or
(B) present no question sufficiently substantial to require explanation of the
reasons for the action taken . . . ; or

(ii) May contain reasons for the judgment but ordinarily not a complete nor necessarily any statement of the facts, in appeals which
(A) are not frivolous but
(B) present arguments concerning the application of recognized rules of law,
which are sufficiently substantial to warrant explanation but are not of general interest or
importance.
168. Nonpublication under Circuit Rule 35 leaves the decision with no precedential value
except as to the rule of the case.
169. Judge Decker's Memorandum Opinion of March 18, 1977 (No. 76 C 2219), at 1-2, noted
that Jacuzzi's correspondence had denied the validity of the patent.
170. E.g., Baker Mfg. Co. v. Whitewater Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1970).
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The Seventh Circuit decided two other intellectual property cases
not involving the patent law. In Heilman v. Bell, t 7 1 the court of appeals
affirmed a grant of summary judgment, holding that duplication of
original, copyrighted recordings is not a permitted "similar use" under
the provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909172 allowing for compulsory

licenses, and that a tape duplicator was liable to criminal prosecution.
In so ruling, the court joined four other circuit courts of appeals which
have decided the same issue. 173 The plaintiffs in Heilman contended
that they were entitled to a compulsory license allowing their duplication of the published sound recordings as a "similar use" of the underlying copyrighted compositions. Under the former compulsory license
provision, one needed only to give notice to the copyright owner and
pay a two-cent statutory royalty prior to making a similar use of the
composition. The court held that duplicating a recording is not "similar" to making an original recording of the composition. 174 The court
further ruled that a criminal prosecution can be brought in order to
stop such tape duplication. Judge Swygert dissented, agreeing with
prior dissents in other cases without expounding upon them. The only
real effect of the publication of the Heilman decision was to place the
Seventh Circuit on record as conforming with the four other circuits
which have similarly decided the issue. 175
The final case reviewed here, Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc. ,176
was an action for trade name and registered service mark infringement.
Plaintiff Telemed used its mark in a distinctive "optical font" style in
marketing to physicians computer analyses of electrocardiograms by
telephone. The defendant used a similar mark, although not in the special typeface, while giving recorded messages to the public under medical society sponsorship. The parties' services did not compete. The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment that the plaintiffs mark was a weak, descriptive trade name which, in the absence of
a strong showing of secondary meaning linking that name to the plain171. 583 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1978). Griffin B. Bell was sued in his capacity as Attorney General
of the United States.
172. See note 13 supra. All citations in the Heilman decision referred to the law prior to
January I, 1978.
173. 583 F.2d at 376. See Fame Publishing Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667
(5th Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 841 (1975); Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings,
Inc., 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975); Edward B. Marks Music
Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120
(1975); Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972).
174. 583 F.2d at 376.
175. See note 173 supra.
176. 588 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978).
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tiff, could not be protected against use by non-competing services. The
court held that the plaintiff had not fulfilled its burden of showing a
strong secondary meaning in the mind of the public. Neither the trial
court nor the court of appeals found any substantial actual confusion.
Both courts dismissed all of the plaintiffs claims. Again, no new law
was made in Telemed, nor was any noteworthy factual dispute resolved.
CONCLUSION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
had a mixed year in its decisions in the intellectual property field. Its
forthright rejection of all synergism tests in Republic Industries, Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co. is a landmark decision in the patent law of the past
decade, not just of the past year alone. The Republic decision is being
hailed and followed by other courts of appeals and by practitioners; it
is both a substantial and a good contribution to clarification of the patent law. The court's decision in Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Monsanto
Co., on the other hand, by barring testimony at trial not identical to
that in the Patent Office proceedings, works a surprising, unnecessary,
and unproductive gloss on judicial review of interference awards. The
unreported Celotex Corp. v. Jacuzzi Whirlpool Bath decision similarly
subverts the established rationale of the special laches and estoppel
doctrines in the patent law.
Between Republic on the one hand and Velsicol and Celotex on
the other, the court of appeals' decisions this past year have followed
known and accepted doctrines. The apparently harsh reductions "to
their essentials" of the inventions of the Scholl, Inc. v. S.S. Kresge Co.
and Republic cases are certainly as much a product of the skill of counsel in simplifying or in mystifying the patented subject matter as of any
underlying anti-patent "bias" the court of appeals may harbor. Indeed,
such a "bias" is inconsistent with the court's refusals to allow patent
invalidation in CTS Corp. v. PiherInternationalCorp. and in Celotex.
The court's docket has been and remains a fertile ground for clash of
advocates in the intellectual law field.

